

Atomic Commitment Across Blockchains

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

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
Open Blockchain Landscape

- Thousands of Blockchains and tokens
- Exchanges to trade tokens for USD
- Direct token transactions in one blockchain
- Direct token transactions across blockchains, **how?**
- **Cross-chain transactions**

Cross-Chain Transaction Example



Atomic Cross-Chain Commitment Protocol



Atomic Swap[Nolan'13, Herlihy'18]

- Alice wants to trade Bitcoin for Ethereum with Bob



Bob



Alice


Atomic Swap[Nolan'13, Herlihy'18]

- Alice wants to trade Bitcoin for Ethereum with Bob



Bob



- Create a secret s 
- Calculate its hash $h = H(s)$



Alice



s and h

Atomic Swap[Nolan'13, Herlihy'18]

- Alice wants to trade X Bitcoin for Y Ethereum with Bob

SC_1 Move X bitcoins to Bob if
Bob provides secret s | $h = H(s)$

Refund SC_1 to Alice if Bob does
not execute SC_1 before **48** hours



Bob




Alice



s and h

Atomic Swap[Nolan'13, Herlihy'18]

- Alice wants to trade X Bitcoin for Y Ethereum with Bob



Atomic Swap[Nolan'13, Herlihy'18]

- Now, h is announced in Bitcoin blockchain and made public

SC_2 Move Y Ethereum to Alice if Alice provides secret s | $h = H(s)$


Refund SC_2 to Bob if Alice does not execute SC_2 before **24** hours



Bob



Bitcoin blockchain




Alice




Atomic Swap[Nolan'13, Herlihy'18]

Ethereum blockchain



Bitcoin blockchain




Bob



Alice




Atomic Swap Example [Nolan'13, Herlihy'18]




Alice reveals the secret to Bob's contract and claims the Y ether

Supposedly, Bob takes the secret, reveals it to Alice's contract and claims the X bitcoins




e.g., $\Delta = 12\text{hr}$

What can go wrong?



If Bob fails or suffers a network denial of service attack for a Δ , Alice's contract will expire and Bob will lose his X bitcoins

Atomicity Violation



e.g., $\Delta = 12\text{hr}$

Atomicity Violation

- Using timelocks leads to **Atomicity violation**
- **Liveness over Safety**
- Our Atomicity-based Approach:
 - The decision of both transactions should be made atomic
 - Once the decision is taken, both transactions either commit or abort
 - A transaction cannot commit unless a commit decision is reached
 - A transaction cannot abort unless an abort decision is reached

Building block: Cross-Chain Verification

- How can miners of one blockchain:
 - Verify a transaction in another blockchain?
 - Without maintaining a copy of this other blockchain.


Building block: Cross-Chain Verification

Need to **verify** that TX₁ is actually in **verified** blockchain

TX₁ Evidence

Verified Blockchain (B)

Verifier Blockchain (A)




Building block: Cross-Chain Verification

- Verification process:

- Each header includes the hash of the previous header
- The proof of work of each header is correct
- TX_1 is correct
- TX_1 is buried under d blocks

- The cost of generating evidence:

- Choose d to make this cost $>$ the value transacted in TX_1
- If true, a malicious user has no incentive to create a fake evidence




Atomic Commitment Across Blockchains

- AC3WN: Atomic Cross Chain Commitment using Witness Network
- Use another blockchain **to witness** the Atomic Swap
- The **witness blockchain** decides **the commit or the abort** of a swap
- Once a decision is made:
 - All sub-transactions in the swap must follow the decision
 - Achieves atomicity, **either all committed or all aborted**
- Cross chain verification is leveraged twice
 - Miners of the **witness network verify** the publishing of contracts in **asset blockchains**
 - Miners of **assets' blockchains verify** the decision made in the **witness network**


Protocol Sketch

- Deploy a contract SC_w in the witness network with state *Published* (P)
- SC_w has a header of a block at depth d of all blockchains in the swap




Protocol Sketch Cont'd

- Participants deploy their contracts in the corresponding blockchains
- Participants add the header of SC_w to their contracts




Protocol Sketch Cont'd

- Participants submit **evidence** of publishing the smart contracts in **Assets Blockchains**
- If all contracts are published and correct, SC_w 's state is altered to redeem (RD)



Protocol Sketch Cont'd


- Participants submit **evidence** of Redeem State (RD) from the **Witness Blockchain** to the **Assets Blockchains**.
- After evidence verification, participants redeem their assets from the **Assets Blockchains**.



Atomic Commitment Across Blockchains

- SC_w 's state determines the commit (RD) or the abort (RF) decision
- Once SC_w 's state is altered and the block is buried under d blocks:
 - All sub-transactions must follow this decision
 - None of the sub-transactions can decide on a different decision
- Even if a participant fails or faces a network denial of service:
 - When the participant recovers, the evidence of the decision still exists
 - This evidence can be used to redeem or refund the contracts
- The only way to violate atomicity is to fork the witness blockchain
- Economic incentives prevent this attack
- Any protocol is prone to fork attacks

AC3WN vs Atomic Swap: Latency



The overall Atomic Cross Chain Transaction latency in Δs as the graph diameter, $\text{Diam}(D)$, increases.

AC3WN vs Atomic Swap: Cost (\$)

- Deployment of the witness network contract
- Evidence validation execution cost at the witness network

Summary

- AC3WM, the first safe Atomic Cross Chain Commitment Protocol
- Constant latency regardless of the swap graph size
- Slightly more deployment cost overhead (\$)